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Book Reviews

Art of Darkness. A Poetics of Gothic by Anne Williams. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. 323. $39.00 cloth; $14.95 paper.

In Art of Darkness, Anne Williams sets out to discover a "poetics" of Gothic, as her subtitle informs us-a set of underlying principles associated not
only with the literature conventionally grouped under the "Gothic" rubric
but also with its Romantic cousins, though Williams herself resists family
metaphors precisely because of their thematic relevance here. Delineating
such a set of "Gothic" principles is itself a tall undertaking. As Eve Sedgwick
remarks, "Gothic" has not been the most supple of terms. Most of the best
recent criticism of Gothic literature, including much gender-inflected commentary, has bracketed the idea of defining it, nodding oniy to the difficulty
of doing so. Different critics have used the term "Gothic" to describe an historical designation or certain plot devices or imagistic conventions or thematics or formal structures or overlapping combinations of these. Thus
Williams's project itself seems necessarily somewhat arbitrary and restrictive. To propose what Gothic itself "is" reifies the category unnecessarily.
Why do so?
Williams's chief reason is to break down the long-discussed division between "Gothic" and "Romantic" in British literature, which often is identified both as to genre and as to gender: "Gothic" novelists (often women,
who appeal to a popular audience) versus "Romantic" poets (men, who
write high art). "Gothic" principles which cut across prose and poetry reveal
what writing in different genres has in common. Of course for a long time
now-certainly since Ellen Moers's classic essay "Female Gothic" and Gilbert
and Gubar's The Madwoman in the Attic-critics have resisted the idea of
seeing Gothic fiction as an illegitimate relative of Romanticism. One part of
Williams's discussion that I find especially lively and interesting is her description of the mutuality of the two: while "Gothic" may well have fed into
a mainstream Romanticism (where one can yet perceive its ughosts," as
Judith Wilt suggested), Romanticism fed back into a "Gothic" tradition.
What I find less valuable is what Williams puts in place of the old categories: a differentiation between "Male" and "Female" Gothic. Again, such a
division is made pOSSible oniy because of the reified (essentialized?) way
"Gothic" itself is described.
At the very beginning of her "Acknowledgments" section, Williams describes what she calls "the main thesis of the book": that the Gothic tradition
"expresses the dangerous, the awe-full power of the 'female.' All Gothic
trappings-ruins, graves, dark enclosures, madness, even the sublime-signify the presence of this 'other'" (xi). Later, in chapter six, Williams notes
that Gothic "permits the return of the repressed-the maternal principle, the
'female,' in all the modes in which it may be recognized: in heroines, in feelings, in the landscape, in death, in l'ecriture," that the Gothic nightmare is
"very much a 'nightmere,'" related to a crisis in Western culture (96). Right!
And nicely put! So, "female Gothic," right?
Wrong! For Williams, "Female Gothic" is the comic plot of the Myth of
Psyche, where ghosts are explained away and which generates suspense
through the limitations imposed by the chosen point of view," usually that
of a heroine (102). "Male Gothic" is the plot of the "Bluebeard" story, with a
If
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tragic end; it enters the fantastic world where ghosts, vampires, and demons
exist; it is voyeuristic, sadistic, even pornographic, usually with multiple
points of view. Williams's classification, which goes beyond merely reiterating, extends and amplifies our understanding of the old distinction between
"terror" Gothic, associated with Ann Radcliffe, and "horror" Gothic, associated with "Monk" Lewis. Sometimes her taxonomy does not quite hold
true. Atm Radcliffe, Mary Shelley, Charlotte and Emily Bronte all use multiple points of view; the work of all of these often tends toward the sadistic
and voyeuristic; yet (although Williams is not necessarily assigning "Male"
Gothic to male writers and "Female" Gothic to women), I believe that she
would call the work of all of these writers "Female Gothic." Frankenstein, one
of the original "Female Gothic" texts described in the Ellen Moers essay that
created the term, is a special problem. Williams discusses it briefly but does
not really suggest its place in her system, except to say that we should read
it as a "Romantic" text.
One problem is that Williams's heavily theoretical discussion tends to be
overly general, in love with the terms of the theory she uses rather than
based on the texts. Sometimes I would like more close readings of these
texts. Although she devotes some attention to novels (The Monk, Dracula, The
Mysteries of Udolpho, as well as Frankenstein), the texts Williams reads most
closely are the more canonical: Coleridge's Rime of the Ancient Mariner and
"Frost at Midnight," Keats's "Eve of St. Agnes." While Williams is interested
in French feminist theory (Kristeva and Irigaray, in particular), the writers
who really engage her are those who have been long valorized; in that way,
she ends up reinscribing the old canon. But while her discussions of these
texts do indeed convince that they deserve election to the Gothic pantheonthat "Gothic in literature is broader than genre, deeper than plot, and wider
than a single tradition" (241)-the real light in these discussions is kindled
from the spark made by the contact between theory and text.
Among the best readings here are those of the two traditional tales
("Bluebeard" and "Psyche") and the epilogue, "The Mysteries of Enlightenment; or Dr. Freud's Gothic Novel," where the collected works of Sigmund
Freud are read as Gothic story. But interestingly, whether Freud's Gothic
is "Male" or "Female" is not altogether dear (the same is true of Keats's)testimony to the problems with the categories themselves.
In assigning sex to the two categories, Williams follows the lead of critics
such as Kate Ellis, who in The Contested Castle (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1989) identified "masculine" and "feminine" forms of Gothic. But
changing Ellis's gender-terms ("masculine" and "feminine") to their biological counterparts ("male" and "female") confuses the issue. The "gendered
Gothic" that Ellis describes makes sense within the (historicist) framework
she uses; but texts are neither male nor female. The term "Male Gothic" appears to have been conjured up as a literary companion to the alreadydescribed "Female Gothic" and defined in reaction to it. "Male Gothic" is
perhaps an inevitable language-effect. Re-identifying the terms does interestingly overturn the usual hegemony of gendering literary modes. While
French-style criticism often makes a great deal out of the idea that literary
modes are masculine-defined, and that the task of women who write is to
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elude such definition, literary criticism here defines a "Male" mode in reaction to a "Female" one.
But Williams uses the term "Female Gothic" in a different sense from the
usual in order to create this dialectic, and the symmetry she creates may not
be worth trading for our other understandings of the term. Like "Gothic" itself, "Female Gothic" has been variously understood, changed, and amplified since Moers, but has tended to stick fairly closely to its original sense: to
suggest a subtext of female sexuality, sometimes also to inquire into other
formal conventions of these texts and their connection to this sub text, as well
as to the historical conditions under which women wrote these novels. Readers have often used the term as a lever to inquire into that very repressedbut-returning, female-identified "other" of which Williams herself writes so
eloquently.
But to generalize from a few critics who "agree that the affinity between
the gender and the genre expresses the terror and rage that women experience within patriarchal social arrangements, especially marriage" (136) overstates the case of such critics, excludes too much, and makes such criticism
sound more monolithic than it really is. The critics who argue this point of
view tend to be historicist, with social concerns; deconstructive and French
Feminist readings have long revealed a different picture of this relationship.
In any case, Williams's rhetorical move is at best ungenerous: after redefining the terms, she takes to task past critics who have failed "to distinguish
the real differences between Male and Female Gothic" (136) or who have
"missed" one or the other categories simply because they haven't defined
the categories as she has. That's hardly fair. This talk of "real differences"
betrays the essentializing at work here, even though she herself protests (in a
different context), "I do not imply that anything is essentially masculine or
feminine" (279). And while Williams does a good job reporting on past feminist criticism of Gothics, she does not really engage it or suggest points of
contact but rather uses it to clear a space for her own theories.
Williams suggests at one point that the mother-daughter relationship
among (Female) Gothic plots "even implies an alternative to Bloom's Oedipal theory of literary influence: a model not founded on conflict but on accretion" (160-61). That thought is not original with Williams, but 1 think it is
correct. But Art of Darkness is a text full of anxiety of influence. Williams
might better have taken a lesson from the Gothic mothers of which she
writes.
If Gothic modes express anxieties of the times when they were written, as
Williams suggests, so too does this book. Such anxieties do not make either
less interesting. Anyone interested in Gothic and Romantic writers and the
relationship between gender and genre should read Art of Darkness.
Cayuga Community College

Susan Wolstenholme

The Politics of English Jacobinism: Writings of John The/wall. Edited by Gregory
Claeys. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995. Pp lxii + 532. $75 cloth, $22.95 paper.
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Jaim Thelwall occupies a peculiar position in British political and literary
history. One of the most versatile and inventive writers and speakers of that
most turbulent and momentous period, the 17905, Thelwall was at once a
far-sighted political theorist, a stalwart defender of working-class interests, a
provocative orator and pamphleteer, an accomplished poet and novelist, and
an experienced journalist and editor (he also had legal and medical training,
and beCan1€ a successful speech therapist, but that is another story). Yet, paradoxically, his very notoriety and eclecticism appear to have condemned
him to obscurity, at first silenced in the conservative backlash of the early
nineteenth century, then swept into the cracks between literary and political
history. Some of his poetry and fiction is accessible to scholars, thanks to a
series of reprints by Garland Press and Woodstock Books in the 1970s and
1980s. Yet he remains an obscure figure in literary history, remembered, if at
all, rather as a minor correspondent of Coleridge than as an innovative
writer whose political sentiments and generic experiments influenced both
Coleridge and Wordsworth at a formative period in their poetical careers. In
the field of political histmy, the situation is reversed. E. P. Thompson's
ground-breaking and popular scholarship and the revival of interest in the
revolutionary decade have elevated Thelwall's reputation among not only
historians but working-class activists in Britain. Yet, oddly, none but short
excerpts of his political writings has ever been reprinted.
With the publication of this first collection of Thelwall's political writings
by British historian Gregory Claeys, readers interested in Thelwall as a political thinker, a literary experimenter, a firebrand reformer or a working-class
hero can have easy access to texts which will allow them to measure the intellectual originality and verbal ingenuity of the man whom his contemporaries called "one of the boldest political writers, speakers and lecturers of
his time" (xiii). Claeys reprints the most important of Thelwall's political
writings and lectures from the period of his greatest public activity and notoriety, 1795-96: two pamphlets, The Natural alld Constitutional Right of BritOilS to Allnual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage, alld the Freedom of Popular
Association and Sober Reflections all the Seditious alld Illflammatory Letter of the
Rt. Han. Edmond Burke to a Noble Lord; substantial selections from Thelwall's
periodical The Tribune, containing his political lectures from that period; and
his most important theoretical work The Rights of Nature. Attractive and
clearly-organized, the volume also contains a detailed critical introduction
to the writings which reviews Thelwall's life and times, and evaluates his intellectual development and significance. Claeys includes a more complete
bibliography of Thelwall's work than any thus published, as well as comprehensive notes and an index.
Claeys' key claim, and the principle behind his selection of texts, is that
Thelwall's real Significance as a radical thinker lies in his economic rather
than his political ideas; or rather, in his shifting of "the discourse on political
rights of the early 1790s ... toward an economic focus" (liv) which anticipates the main thrust of 19th-century radicalism. Of the four major texts reprinted here, there is much that is representative of the "discourse of
political rights" in the period: vigorous vindications of freedoms of speech
and association and universal suffrage; passionate defenses of the essential
principles of both the French Revolution and the English republican tradi-
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tion; spirited and satirical attacks on aristocracy and monarchy, luxury and
corruption, patronage and prilTlOgeniture; reasoned calls for reform of property and redistribution of wealth. Many of the ideas found in these writings
are shared by others, notably Thomas Paine, whose inflated reputation has
tended to cast Thelwall into the role of a popularizer rather than an originator. VVhile Claeys acknowledges Thehvall's importance as a spokesman,
"restating ,vith great conviction the virtues of the English republican tradition against the inhumanity of aristocratic cabals" (xxxvi), his real mission is
to restore Thelwall's "great originality" as "one of the most perceptive and
innovative thinkers among the reformers, probing into many areas untouched by his more renmvned contemporary, Thomas Paine" (xxxvi). Hence
he reprints The Rights of Nature and selections from The Tribune which show
the unique economic focus that Thehvall gave to the political debate. According to Claeys, these writings shmv Thelwall turning a\vay from the narrowly moral and anti-commercial perspective that characterizes both
nostalgic pastoralists like Godwin, and classical republicans like Burgh. Instead 111elwall confronts and embraces the modern commercial system, analyzing its origins and nature, its benefits and inequities, from an urban,
political and economic perspective. "T\10re dynamic and commerciallyoriented" than Paine (xlvi), Thelwall goes beyond his better-known contemporary by focusing on class in relation to the means of production, and property in relation to the rights of labour. Grafting economic ideas drawn from
Adam Smith onto Painite ideas of political and social equality, Thelwall in
The Rights of Nature proposes "a new vision of economic justice ... centred
on the contractual relations between worker and employer" as equals,
thereby heralding that "ideal of cooperative partnership between labour and
capital" that characterizes much nineteenth-century liberal and socialist
thought (JiiHiv).
Claeys' resurrection and reevaluation of Thelwall as an innovative political
and economic thinker is peculiarly timely now, in an era in which the discourse of political rights has been so thoroughly coopted by the discourse of
economics. It is appropriate that as global economic forces endeavour to
wipe out the social gains of the past 200 years, we be reminded of those who
analyzed the conflict between market values and democratic ideals at its origin. It is refreshing, too, to hear a voice which argues, with energy, wit and
conviction, that social principles need not be sacrificed on the altar of financial expediency, that the poor and the disenfranchised have not only the
right but the intellectual resources to make informed decisions, and that labour is the genuine basis for property: "Let the proprietor reflect upon the
nature of his possession -let him reflect upon the genuine basis of property.
What is it, after all, but human labour? And who is the proprietor of that labour?- Who, but the individual who labours?" (The Rights of Noture, 475).
'Alhether enquiring into the rights of labourers, investigating the causes of
poverty, defending the right to associate, or advocating rational enquiry over
violent agitation, Thelwall consistently combines analysis with activism, philosophy with pragmatism, the intellectual with the popular.
This philosophic populism, or principled pragmatism, is perhaps the most
notable quality of this collection. These are theories shaped, tested and
marked by a knowledge of the people, a grasp of practical politics and an
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experience of government persecution that other theorists of the period lack.
Thelwall's experience as the chief strategist of the London Corresponding
Society, a speaker at vast outdoor lectures, a political prisoner and defendant
in the Treason Trials of 1794, and a target of informers and church-and-king
mobs leaves him intensely aware of the power of the state and of the vulnerability of individuals and the populace exposed to its repressive measures.
Nevertheless this experience renders all the more intense his faith in the
power of rational enquiry and his respect for the intellectual capacity of the
common people, their willingness and desire to reason and judge for themselves. nlis faith is born out of and borne out by Thelwall's participation in
the debating clubs and corresponding societies that, for a brief period in the
1790s, became the working-class equivalents of those genteel social clubs
which were so fundamental to the development of society and culture in the
late eighteenth century. In The Rights of Nature Thelwall announces a radical
recentering of this cultural capital:

Man is, by his very nature, social and communicative. . Whatever
presses men together, therefore, though it may generate some vices, is
favourable to the diffusion of knowledge, and ultimately promotive of
human liberty. Hence every large workshop and manufactory is a sort
of political society, which no act of parliament can silence, and no
magistrate disperse .... [A] sort of Socratic spirit will necessarily grow
up, wherever large bodies of men assemble. Each brings, as it were,
into the common bank his mite of information, and putting it to a sort
of circulating usance, each contributor has the advantage of a large
interest, without any diminution of capital (400-401).

Effectively countering Burke's metaphor of civilized tradition as a bank of
ages, Thelwall's notion of the factory as a credit union of ideas not only illustrates the economic focus that Claeys finds so characteristic of Thelwall's political writings, but fits well with his overall emphasis in The Rights of Nature
on the circulation of knowledge, which "cannot operate, to any beneficial
purpose, or produce any general civilization of society, till it becomes pretty
generally diffused" (486). Linking the monopolization of knowledge to monopolies of power and property, Thelwall argues strongly that those who labour for knowledge to exist have an equal right to obtain its .advantages. His
work is a conscious attempt to wrest the space of discussion away from the
aristocratic monopolizers, to recentre the narrow circle of knowledge and
extend it to the
"hundreds, nay thousands, in those classes excluded from [Burke's]
calculations, who though they could neither endite, nor comprehend
his learned metaphors and dashing periods, would yet blush at [his]
flimsy sophisms
who understand the principles of government
mucb better than himself, and who want nothing but practical fluency
to render them most formidable antagomsts to the whole college of
aristocratical disclaimers" (399-400).
This emphasis on the circulation and diffusion of knowledge, this promotion of a cooperative information economy, is reflected in Thelwall's own
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rhetorical strategy. He can occasionally be self-dramatizing and egotistical,
takirlg the stance of a prophet or martyr (predictably, such gestures increase
in the later writings, as he feels increasingly beleaguered and persecuted).
But on the whole Thelwall takes great pains to decenter his authority, to
present himself neither as pedagogue nor as demagogue, but as a planter
of seeds for his listeners and readers to cultivate, a gatherer of "materials
wherewith to work for themselves in those grand enquiries in which it is the
happiness and interest of man to be engaged" (Tribune, 80-81). Among these
materials are the facts, anecdotes and statistics which are some of the most
striking features of the Tribune. In one lecture, in a more direct and down-toearth version of Paine's analysis of tax statistics, Thelwall tabulates weekly
earnings and expenses of poor families to counter prejudices about the indulgent and indolent nature of the laborious poor; in another, in a technique
that anticipates and may well have influenced Cobbett, he pursues the same
end by setting images of rural life gained from poetry and from his own rural walks side by side by side:
I took the opportunity of seeing, as far as I could, the condition of
those orders of society, about whose happiness in the country I had
heard so many romantic stories, while I was an inhabitant of the town,
and took my ideas of rural felicity from novels and pastorals. I beheld
there poor women, doubled with age, toiling, from morning to night,
over their wheels, spirming their flax and hemp ... I was astonished, I
own, at this picture of misery. I had read a good deal in poems and
romances about rural felicity. I did not kn.0w that rural felicity consisted in sitting over a wheel until one is double, and getting neither
comforts nor conveniencies-no, nor the necessaries of life, to sustain
and prop one's declining years, by this eternal drudgery (165-66).
Here, as elsewhere, Thelwall presents himself as the model for his listeners
and readers: a sympathetic self-educated man straddling the artisan and
professional classes, in whom the collision behveen sentiment and self-interest, idealism and economics, prejudice and experience, has brought to an
understanding of the need for radical reform.
TIle same collision of the sociological and the sentimentat the theoretical
and the commercial, the pragmatic and the poetic is evident in ThelwaJ]'s
style, "\vhich he tells his readers in The Tribune is calculated to "steel your
breasts and soften your hearts at the same moment" (151). Often he juxtaposes the concrete and the abstract, as in his frequent apologies for descending from sentimental idealism, prophetic indignation or political speculation
to "minute particulars of aritlunetic" in order to "drive the nail of conviction
into the hard block of a heart which dv,'ells, but too frequently, in the bosom
of the proud being "\ve call man" (262). Metaphysics and materialism often
collide, as in this passage from The Rights of Nntllrc in which gothic po\,\lers
of the state are set against the physiological (literally organ-ie) body of the
people:
"[T]o lay this 'wandering ghost of popular discontent, the simulator,
Pitt, has drawn once more around him the magic circle of delusion,
with charms and spells of pretended negociation, and b<lekward ml1t-
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ters of arrogance and recantation. But lift up your voices, ye artificers,
ye mechanics, ye manufachlrers of the land! ... Wear not your lW1gs
with sighs and sullen murmurs-let not only the nocturnal phantom,
but the living body of your complaints appear before your oppressors .
. . . [TJell them ... that 'your discontent can never be allayed, without
the restoration of equal rights, and equal laws, and the adoption of a
pure and independent organ, through which the opinions ... of the
whole nation, can be freely delivered, and distinctly heard" (404-05).
Such metaphorical juxtapositions make for a vivid and engaging style. Indeed, one of the most useful aspects of this collection is that it may at last
put to rest a misperception that has dogged Thelwall since Hazlitl first made
it: that his written prose is drab and flat, lacking the rhetorical brilliance of
Burke, the plainspoken clarity of Paine, or even the fire and force of his own
speaking style. None of these selections gives any ground for such disparagement. While there are plenty of exclamation marks, and over-emphatic or
hyperbolic expressions, what strikes one after reading these writings is not
just the vigour and rhetorical flourish of Thelwall's prose, but its variety and
flexibility. Thelwall's style ranges from the elevated language of constitutions to direct addresses to the common man, from allegory to street songs,
from abstract principles to concrete, dramatic particulars. Especially notable
is the mingling and shifting of tones and voices, which also characterizes
Thelwall's literary work. In The Rights of Nature, for example, Thelwall dramatizes the conflict between natural and contractual rights in the voices of 2
speakers: a passionately eloquent but eminently rational Mother Nahlre and
an Employer whose dismissive and peremptory vernacular makes him
sound like one of Fielding's apoplectic Squires.
A versatile satirist and brilliant mimic, Thelwall is at his best when going
head to head with Burke, which he does in The Rights of Nature by quoting
him copiously, then engaging with his words as in debate. At one moment
he adopts Burke's own terminology and tone, rising to the same passionate
metaphorical pitch in order to argue the opposite point. At the next moment
he playfully reverses, literalizes, deconstructs and/ or improvises upon
Burke's metaphors. Sometimes he uses logic to analyze and undermine his
opponent's terms and premises; at others he discredits his principles by
identifying them with the very groups and ideas that Burke reviled. In its
extravagant and dynamic dialogism, it is a virtuoso performance of the oppositional techniques that characterize radical satire, according to Jon
Klancher and Marcus Wood. But Burke is by no means 111elwall's only target; his appropriation of and play upon his opponents' language is often
more generat as in this passage from The Tribune in which he analyses the
causes of scarcity of salt-water fish, taking aim at those who see jacobinical
discontent as cause of all complaint by asking
Will any man make me believe that the fishes are infected also with
the rage of emigration? - Will you tell me that they also have drank
the poisonous doctrines of jacobinism, and become discontented with
the glorious constitution, under which for so many centuries they have
so happily been eaten; and that, therefore, the herrings have fled from
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the coasts of Scotland, and the salmon deserted our rivers, and, together with the other factious inhabitants of our streams and shores,
have fled, with atheistical abhorrence of all regular government, to the
coasts and rivers of French anarchy, or the distant and happy shores of
America, that they might enjoy the pleasure of being eaten without alloy from the consideration that they were put in the mouths of what
they rebelliously consider as bondmen and slaves? (69).
This passage offers good evidence, too, of one of the most appealing characteristics of Thelwall's writing: his sense of humour, a quality missing from
so many of the other participants in the revolution debate. Even at his most
scathingly satiric, Thelwall retains a genial good telnper, and even pokes fun
at himself on occasion.
Thelwall's wit and dramatic flair, his rhetorical versatility, his shifts and
sallies of trope and tone, account for his phenomenal popularity as an orator
and make these selections a pleasure to read, inclining one to feel that a detailed study of Thelwall's prose style is long overdue. But more than this,
these qualities invite the literary critic to reflect on a broader subject which
critics like Olivia Smith and Don Bialostosky have only begun to develop:
the influence of public discussion, political oratory and popular speech genres upon the romantic literary imagination. In the light of Thelwall's friendship with Coleridge and Wordsworth, for example, it is not impossibleindeed, it is likely-that much of the poetry, as well as the theory, of Lyrical
Ballads bears traces of Thelwall's influence. Certainly these selections contain
many figures that will be familiar to readers of romantic poetry, including an
old woman stealing sticks from hedges who appears to be the original of
Wordsworth's Goody Blake. As both an orator and a disciple of Horne
Tooke, Thelwall may well have taught Wordsworth much about the "real
language of men."
Not only Thelwa]]'s rhetoric, but his political and economic ideas may be
of interest to the literary scholar. Throughout The Rights of Natllre, Thelwall
consistently links his economic argument to issues of intellechtal and discursive labour, property, inheritance and distribution. His ideas have radical
implications for our view of literary relations and textual value, suggesting,
among other things, that the value of any cultural product lies more in its
circulation, its status as a medium of exchange or a space for debate, than in
its aesthetic quality or metaphysical truth-claims.
It is ironic that someone as committed to intellectual exchange and accessibility as Thehvall was should have been taken out of circulation by the vicissitudes of history. Claeys' fine edition should help put Thelwall back in the
mainstream of political history. If his literary works were given equal attention, this inh·iguing and challenging thinker and stylist of the 1790s might
yet have much to contribute to debates about politics, economics, literahlre
and their relationship in the 1990s.

Dalhol/sie University

Judith 111Ompson
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A Defense af Paetry: Reflections 0/1 the Occasion of Writing by Paul H. Fry. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Pp. 255. $45.00, cloth; $16.95,
paper.
As Paul Fry's title shows, a point of departure for his intricate and welcome reflections on "writing" is Shelley's famous essay, A Defence af Poetry.
Fry rightly praises this essay as "the strongest defense of poetry ever written," seeing it as pioneering a genre, the '''critique of Enlightenment''' (3), to
which his own volume seeks to belong. But he finds fault with Shelley's essayan two counts: it conceives of poetry "not as a suspension of truth-claims
but as a renewal of them" (3) and its broad definition of poetry raises the
question "poetry as opposed to what?" (4). Fry sees the purpose of his book
as an attempt to find answers to these perceived weaknesses in Shelley's essay; he asserts: "I claim that poetry (literature, expressive communication),
unlike other forms of discourse that exhaust themselves shaping or making
sense of things, is that characteristic of utterance, defined as "ostension" in
the ensuing chapters, which telnporarily releases consciousness from its dependence on the signifying process" (4). F>y wants poetry to be negatively
capable with regard to "truth," to suspend our irritable reaching after certainty. Indeed, one of his most intriguing chapters is his "Conclusion/' entitled "The Ethics of Suspending Knowledge," in which he argues that "the
suspension of knowledge enabled by ostension can serve to reinvigorate the
very quest it interrupts" (201) and relates his position to, or rather insinuates
its affinity with, Blanchot's hostility to "knowledge" in "Literature an the
Right to Death" (though, for Fry, Blanchot "aestheticizes the moment more
than I wish to do" [209]). Lyotard's attempt to "think the nonhuman" (206) is
also enlisted by Fry in his praise of ostension. But Fry does more here than
drop names with gusto; he makes one realize the significance of a number of
seemingly anti-humanist remarks made by the thinkers whose work he describes. More than this, he establishes, with a quietly unintimidated poise, a
sense of his own nuanced reservations about the ideas of these thinkers; he
remains, throughout, independent and stimulating, nowhere more so than in
the final paragraph where he suggests w>yly that the enterprise which he
recommends is unachievable: "But can we, after all, think the nonhuman,
which is as much as to say, the real? Probably not" (211).
A Defense af Poetry consists of three parts and nine chapters, with an introduction and a conclusion as bookends. Its key term, ostension, presides over
the first part, made of four chapters which seek to define "the ostensive
moment" (5) as bound up with "Non-construction" (chapter 1), "Insignificance" (chapter 2), "estrangement from instrumental language" (50; chapter 3), and the envious discovery by poems of "the meaninglessness of the
nonhuman in pictures" (70; chapter 4). Ostension allows Fry to defend with
resourceful ingenuity positions which bear a family resemblance to some traditional notions. Though the author is at pains to describe, say, his belief in
the "invariability of recurrent experience" as "pan-historical" rather than
"transhistorical" (36), it is striking how often he makes us revalue would-be
demystifications as themselves deeply mystified. In his attempt to answer
the question "Why do we have literature at all?" (42), Fry suggests tl1at one
usual answer, to satisfy our need for fictions, plays into the hands of a dis-
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course, that of llhistory," which is at odds with lithe function of literature."
For Fry, we need literature, not because we want something truer than fiction (after all, "the ostensive moment of literature may possibly focus a false
intuition"), but because we want from it the complex freedom that derives
from a "literary letting-be" (43) of existence.
The book's second part contains, under the healing "Non-epiphany," brilliant readings of Wordsworth (chapter 5) and Keats (chapter 6, a revamped
version of Fry's important essay on "To Autumn" first published in the
"Keats and Politics" Forum which appeared in Studies in Romanticism, 25:2,
1986), and a more baffling meditation on the sublime (chapter 7) which
argues that "the identifying trait of literature is ... not the sublime" (133). In
this last instance, Fry's negative critical way leads into a convoluted labyrinth. The sublime's appearance of deferring "significance" (against which
Fry tilts throughout) is deceptive; it is, in fact, "the form of the formless and
progenitor of all form" (134). Here, one might glimpse the limits of Fry's refreshing wish to abstain from the hunt for "Significance." Privileging ostension, he at times adopts an implicitly (and not useful) moralizing tone with
regard to subjectivity, the imagination's ambitions, and the supposedly interfering lyric ego that reminds this reader of the less productive aspects of Objectivist poetics. The trust in "existence" (always opposed to the "human")
leads Fry to a definition of "literature" whose purity risks a damaging exclusiveness.
That said, the reading of Wordsworth in chapter 5 is genuinely illuminating about the way the poet's imagination does not illuminate. Rather, for
Fry, Wordsworth's great moments are those "in which he is allowed to see
nothing at all" (95), in which he discovers, or has impressed upon him,
"opacity" (97), resistance to the imagination's fantasy of dominion, "The
rock" as "the grey particular of man's life," in Stevens's words (quoted on
107). The chapter on Keats contains an intriguing paragraph on the influence
of Heidegger, a thinker whose emphaSiS on "being" is highly relevant to
Fry's project. Fry describes and separates himself from two paths out of Heidegger: the "theological" (109) and the "glOOmily 'existential''' (110). His
own position is further refined when he distinguishes his "extreme form of
anti-intellectualism" from "historicism and formalism" (111). These last two
isms seem opposed but they are lUlited, so Fry argues, in their application to
Keats Gerome McGann and Helen Vendler are the respective exemplars), by
their lack of lIa sense of otherness in the substance of existence that has little
to do with social consciousness or with the compensations of artistic form"
(122). It is just such "a sense of otherness" or "intimacy with existence" (the
phrase is Stanley Cavell's, quoted on 132) which is given by "To Autumn";
the poem is read with Fry's characteristic sureness of touch and allusive
riclmess of critical engagement, though it would have been of great interest
to have watched him producing a full-scale account of one of Keats's more
frankly subjective poems, such as "Ode to a Nightingale." "To Autumn"
serves his argument a little too well, even though the poem's admirers
should be lastingly grateful to Fry for putting to flight the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (129-30) evident in McGann's politicizing reading.
The final two chapters of the book make up its third part, entitled "Return
of the Same." The first chapter (the eightl1) addresses the "connection be-
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tween burial and poetry" (159) in Wordsworth and Byron, and argues that
"For both poets, the poem itself ... denies its secondariness to the signified
.. and thereby proposes itself as the sole place where life is present" (178).
By means of this argumentative legerdemain, Fry is able to link together
self-consciousness (which discovers that the true reality is "somatic selfidentity," 177) and ostension, as well as tvvo writers who seem poles apart in
style and theme. The much-trodden ground of the epitaph is made to yield
up insights compatible with Fry's by now recurrent emphases: "The epitaph," he writes, "is the grave site of the sublime but the privileged site of
the' common'" (180). For all the chapter's insight (it is especially helpful on
The Excursion), it ultimately makes very different poems fit the argument,
rather than the argument fit the poems. The last chapter returns to the theme
of death, and particularly to the '''romantic moment' of dying" (182) in a
dazzling range of works, in order to counter the claim that the Romantics
represent death morbidly. Instead, Fry sees in the different approaches
which he documents "an anti-rhetoric" which may be "sentinlentalized" but
which is "rarely if ever morbid" (185). Inevitably, "A Slumber Did My Spirit
Seal" makes its obligatory appearance, this time proving that "the spirit is
never unsealed" (199), thus reinforcing the argument of chapter 5. As interesting are the comments on Shelley (especially the lady's death by dash and
exclamation in "The Sensitive Plant), Browning, and Edward Thomas-all at
the service of a complex argument which, drawing on Bataille's notion of
Eros and Thanatos as "transgression" (quoted on 200), contends that death
transgresses "the decorum of otherness." TI1erefore, Romantic writers treat
death with a brevity which minimizes complicity in transgression yet marks
an absence that threatens the absence on which "\vriting is predicated" (200).
Like most pages in this important book, the one from which I have just
quoted requires patient and repeated readings; yet readers of A Defense of
Poetry will find that the book rewards richly the attention which it demands.
University of Durham, UK

MichaelO'Neill

Jane Austen and Discourses of Feminism edited by Devoney Looser. New York:
SI. Martin's Press, 1995, Pp. x + 197. $39.95.
Jane Austen and Discourses of Feminism, edited by Devoney Looser, is a
collection of original essays designed to take the measure of current feminist
thinking about Austen and to establish, as it were, a kind of feminist context
for that thinking. In "Privacy, Privilege, and 'Poaching' in Mansfield Park,"
the penultimate essay, Ellen Gardiner observes that "One of the reasons that
Jane Austen has remained part of the twentieth-century canon is. . [that],
as omniscient narrator in various novels, she continues to convince scholars
that she is not merely a writer but also a critic" (151). Indeed, a central element in each of the articles in this volume, as well as in the book as a whole,
is to find the reason for Austen's perseverance in the canon in the face of a
conceivable recalcitrance to twentieth-century concerns on the part of a late
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century opus, to say nothing of the
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mission among those very scholars to justify as unique and necessary their
own contributions to the profusion of Austen commentary. They and it must
ans"\ver the question, lNhat more remains to be said? And yet the fact remains that there are large and significant divergences and diversities of
opinion about the author; despite all the ink that has been spilled, in large
measure there is still a knotty stubbornness in her works that seems ultimately, and like the works themselves, courteously and quietly, to resist al1
attempts to penetrate and lay bare forever what she was about. On the one
hand, the feminist context seems as if it would be exactly hospitable to
studies of Austen; on the other hand, there is something inescapable and indefinable, which leads to conflict and controversy among the critics.
For instance, in "Consolidated Communities: Masculine and Feminine Values in Jane Austen's Fiction/' Glenda Hudson takes an unexpectedly resolute exception to the claims made by Claudia Jolmson and others about the
ending of Mansfield Parle Johnson is one of the two presiding, albeit absent,
formative geniuses of the critical approaches in this collection; the other is
Alison Sulloway, whose presence is lllDre directly invoked by the book's
dedication. Their influence, nonetheless, indicates the continued development of feminist critiques of Austen. Tt does seem a shame, though, that
Johnson and Sulloway are not represented in this assembly since so much of
the argument seems to steIn from territory they initially staked. In any case,
Hudson argues against Johnson's claim that the ending is not happy despite
the fact that the form-a marriage-is appropriate to the typos-a comedy
("But Austen's works reveal nothing of the sort" [108]). Hudson offers a
compelling and interesting argument built on a carefully crafted edifice of
congenial rather than the presumably more likely disquieting nature of incest, but in some ways the larger and more vexing question is, H01V can it be
that supposedly attentive and scrupulous readers c;:nmot even agree on
whether or not the ending of a book is positive and restful? What hope is
there for common ground and a level playing field if even the tone of the
close of a book is in question? The feminist context, at the least, then, seems
to be fraying here.
v\That Devoney Looser has undertaken, as she indicates in the introduction
to this volume, is to display examples from "the thriving industry of Jane
Austen criticism," where "the driving force is arguably feminist" (1). The two
men and eight women whose essays she includes address varying aspects of
"the workings of gender politics in her novels" (9). But that may well be the
only common denominator as the critics range independently across issues
of sociopolitics as an endowment of Anglican Enlightenment (Gary Kelly's
"Jane Austen, Romantic Feminism, and Civil Society"); feminist rewriting of
historiography in the juverulia (Antoinette Burton's "/Invention Is vVhat Delights Me': Jane Austen's Remaking of 'English' History"); Austen as developer of Literahlre with a capital L (Clifford Siskin's "Jane Austen and the
Engendering of DiscipJinarity"); aspects of the Gothic, probably the least innovative of the topics of this book (Diane Hoeveler's "Vindicating Northal1ger
Abbey: Mary vVollstonecraft, Jane Austen, and Gothic Feminism" and Maria
Jerinic's "In Defense of the Gothic: Rereading Nortlwl1gcr Abbey"); and, perhaps inevitably, homoeroticism in the 'ivork of an unmarried 'ivoman (in
Misty Anderson's "'The Different Sorts of Friendship': Desire in Mmlsfielri
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Park"). What is apparent is that the dialogues or discourses in which these
authors participate are not with one another since their subjects are, for the
most part, so disparate. Even in the two essays on Northanger Abbey and the
three in effect dedicated to Mansfield Park, including Hudson's which is located separately from the two in the identified MP section, the terms and
contents of the arguments differ radically, finally. It is not so much that the
critics talk at cross purposes as that they engage diverging agendas and operate on differently tilted planes. This certainly makes this assembly rich and
provocative, and readers who consult most of these essays will be rewarded
for their efforts, but it also simultaneously opens a gap at the center. Whom
is the discourse of these learned experts with, then? Or, better, whom is the
feminist discourse about Jane Austen with?
Before I continue, I urge readers particularly to savor the insights of Laura
Mooneyham White's "Jane Austen and the Marriage Plot: Questions of Persistence," which, with Hudson's piece, is one of the two finest essays here.
White endeavors to understand the marriage plot through three of the novels and the final fragment Sanditon in terms that concede contemporary realities and position the premise in relation to this context rather than in
defiance of it. For instance, the critic writes, "Austen's earlier work all emphasize that through marriage one becomes part of a social and economic entity. Marriage allows the heroine to join the wholeness of society even as she
joins the unity of male and female. But the social and psychological integration marriage has represented may never have been a narrative goal in this
last Austen narrative. In the flux of Sanditon, marriage'S utility as a symbol
of this all-encompassing integration is seriously marred. There is no stable
society left ... Here Austen bravely faces a new world in which the endings
are open, in which marriage and its attendant securities are no longer guaranteed. Sanditon may represent the undoing of Austen's earlier sexual determinlsm. As a text in which the erotic seems to be unmoored from its earlier
position as sexual anchor, Sanditon allows the reader of Austen to experience
that surprise, emptiness, and excitement appropriate to a new form of fictional understanding" (83). Forgive me for the long quote, but I seek to convey the richness and full flavor of White's critique, the ways that it embraces
structural, psychological, and historical approaches in an enlightening analysis of the form and genre of the text.
Repeatedly as I have read and thought about this book I have wanted to
insert the article "the" between the third and fourth words of the title: Jane
Austen and [the] Discourses of Feminism. That that little word is truant is, I
think, important to the project of this collection. Its absence speaks to the
"gap" I mentioned above. Were the article supplied, there would be an implicit definition of the topic, a restriction of the breadth of the contents of this
volume and likely thereby a parallel fOCUSing of the contents of the book
upon a particular understanding or delineation or demarcation of the subject. In that case, with the discourse defined, the assembled writers would
address the same issues or different issues from similar perspectives. Instead, without the article, the subject becomes or is revealed to be diffuse,
unlimited, perhaps inexhaustible. And that is the promise, the paradox, and
the problem herein, jt seems to me.
Of course, to some extent the dialogue is with the reader if the reader is
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uninformed or disinclined to agree or to be persuaded. However, assuming
that we are all willing to entertain the unfolding arguments at least through
the course of their deployment, it seems to me that, openly or not, there is
another actor in the dialogue, and that is Jane Austen herself. And, at the
least, she is not cooperating, not complicit. I'll use two of the essays to
illustrate.
Siskin declares that Austen's failure even to attempt to contribute, much
less to participate, in the prodigious periodical publication of fiction in her
era argues for a conscious decision on her part to opt for Literature: "VV-hat
this comparative judgment [her much quoted defense of the novel in Northanger Abbey] and her publication decisions-whatever the other factors that
influenced them -point to is Austen's apparent participation in the historical
transformation of the two-tier market into a hierarchical system of what we
now know as high versus low culture-a hierarchization that in narrowing
the range of proper writing ushered in the disCiplinary advent of the new
category of Literature" (56). Several implications emerge here. First, the comment, "whatever the other factors that influenced them/' seems a qualification that might potentially derail the entire argument but that is barely
acknowledged. However, probably of more moment in terms of the thesis is
the imputation that Austen is reborn as a critic in the same fashion that the
opening quote by Gardiner accomplishes. Moreover, she is even become, following this same line of reasoning, virtually a prototypical Modernist before
her time~opting for the elite standards of a restricted readership-if not as a
partisan in the self-conscious studies overseen by English Deparhnents
which the term "discipline" in the argument suggests. Moreover, but also,
perhaps more to the point, the commentary endeavors to tell us her motivation. That is to say, we have an example, it appears, of the intentional fallacy. This is what Austen meant to do or to say. We understand what she
does because we declare why she did it. The context supplies meaning and
motivation at once.
Similarly, Anderson's essay interprets in a new way the uneasiness that
Fanny Price in Mansfield Price feels in the presence of Mary Crawford, which
generations of readers surely assumed derived from Fanny's knowledge that
not only did both of them love the same man, Edmund, but that also, most
probably, Mary was his beloved rather than Fanny. For those same generations Fanny's discomfort and unhappiness were satisfactorily accounted for
as both envy and jealousy, I presume. However, under the new dispensation
they are identified as sexual attraction. In fact, they turn out to constitute the
love that cannot be named, in fact, the love that Austen could not name.
Anderson writes, "These unwritten plots include the suppressed or interrupted narratives of Mansfield Park that were incompatible with its plot and
with social convention. Austen breaks her silence to attempt to tell the story
of the 'I' [the interpolated narrative voice], which is the 'desire for another
logic of plot' that cannot fit in the story or its ideology. Perhaps it is the story
of a woman's desires and their multifaceted forms that were edited posthumously by her sister Cassandra down to what Janet Todd called the
'harmless residue' of Jane Austen's life" (182). Thus, we are informed that
both Jane and Cassandra deliberately chose to conceal a lesbian story, and
that that indeed was the truth all along. In other words, to be blunt, a text
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can be willfully misread via a twentieth-century feminist construct and then
attributed to the author herself and to her nineteenth-century family. If this
is so, then truly the possibilities of criticism are inexhaustible, if not infinite.
There are truly no limits when we discount contemporaneous culture.
Discourses of feminism, in short, then, are with Austen herself. If they are
correct, they attempt to tell her what she must surely already know, that is,
the meanings and motives behind her art. If they are wrong, then of what
value are they? However, the point is that they function on the level of intention and purpose rather than result and product, style and art. Hence, it
is ultimately not any surprise if there is some residual resistance on the part
of the text to even the most determined of critics to wrench a particular
meaning out of it. Too bad we don't just let the books speak to us. Too bad
we are often so busy speaking that we cannot always hear what they have to
say.
Kennesaw State University

Laura Dabundo

Majestic Indolence: English Romantic Poetry and the Work of Art by Willard
Spiegelman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xii + 221. $45.00.

In his study of poetry as both otium and negotium (play and work), Willard
Spiegelman defends aesthetics against a Marxist new historicism that attempts "to appropriate literature to sociology and politics at the end of the
twentieth century, and to ignore the pleasure principle at work behind acts
of reading" (5). While Spiegelman is interested primarily in acts of composition, in the pleasurable and anxious labor of creating poetry, the joy of close
reading too is everywhere evident in his book, which traces the related topoi
of work and play through Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Whitman,
and Frost.
Spiegelman takes "the general theme of indolence" (157) and inflects it in
both positive and negative directions, toward the one pole represented by a
Wordsworthian "wise passiveness" but also toward the opposite pole of a
Coleridgean paralysis of the will. Indolence may be sloth, torpor, or WhitIDanian "loafing," but it may also be a period of preparation, a time-out from
the aesthetic wars of eternity. Indolence, for Spiegelman, is thus an active
resting-place: ideally it follows creative activity, yet also prepares the poet
for sallying forth again. It is, for the time being, a place of play that is also a
place of work. Idleness, however, often produces guilt-a fear of unmanliness, melancholy, and even sinfulness-but equally it carries a positive social valence for those who can afford to be idle. During the Romantic period,
Spiegelman argues, indolence "became paradoxically a symptom of the disease of modern life at the same time that leisure, recreation, and rural retreat
were viewed as having curative powers to assuage the emotional, psychological, and physical strains of that life" (15).
In his first chapter Spiegelman traces the changing attitudes toward indolence, from "monastic vice" (7) to eighteenth-century fashionable experience,
in order to read the poetry of the major Romantics against this social back-

c

Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 4: Book Reviews

649

drop. But Spiegelman's main focus is on indolence as a rhetorical topos in
specific poems that he groups under the genre of pastoral. He takes as his
starting place Wordsworth, whose Ifgreatest original work is his defense of
play: business and leisure turn out to be pretty much the same thing" (23).
This idea cuts both ways: not only does it validate "that majestic indolence
so dear / To native man" (Prelude 8.255-56) as being necessary and desirable, but it also glorifies the writing of poetry as in itself a kind of
"honorable toil" (Prelude 1.626). The topos of "honorable toi!," which Coleridge also invokes in "Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement/'
need not be opposed to the labor of an active life; when it comes to art, work
and play "turn out to be pretty much the same thing," and thus the poetic
text becomes the site where the opposing terms in such binaries as contemplative/active, leisure/laboy, ohum/negotiunl, and so on, are unsettled and
revealed to be repetition with a difference. In Wordsworth, lithe toil of
verse" (Prelude 4.111) means hard work: "writing is labor" (52).
And yet more than any other Romantic poet, Wordsworth expresses a
double anxiety over writing poetry and over not writing it. When he manifests the former, it is tied up with guilt over the idleness of being a poet; yet
equally "like a guilty thing," Wordsworth compares himself to a truant, a
false steward, a recreant, when he does not write poetry, when poetic numbers fail to come spontaneously, when his harp is defrauded and the singer
ends in silence. With Coleridge, Spiegelman argues, this anxious struggle
takes the form of a continuous self-reproach expressed in language that
seeks to thematize its paralyzing torpor: "Coleridge'S poetry surrounds, even
derives from, an abyss, a psychic depression that he defines through certain
rhetorical habits" (60)-chief of which is the figure of chiasmus, the A-B-B-A
crossover that centers on an absent point of reference, something undefined,
like Coleridge's "grief without a pang." Spiegelman claims that "Coleridge is
the master of chiasmus" (64), which he uses as a figure of "enfolding, mimicking, or mirroring" (67): "Chiasmus as the rhetorical gesture of enclosure
everywhere counters the urmameable, indefinable dread at the heart of Coleridge's poetry" (67). In a fine reading of the conversation poems, and in particular of "Dejection," which stands as a test case, Spiegelman concentrates
on the recurrent topoi of Coleridge's feminizing passivity, self-canceling unresponsiveness, and rhetorical negation.
Spiegelman contends that "Indolence occupies the central place in Keats's
aesthetics as well as in his poetic achievement" (85). Keats invested deeply
in his evolving response to earlier representations of indolence, especially
those by Milton and Thomson, and while he does not share Coleridge's paralysis, he does exhibit a conventional ambivalence toward idleness that can
be "both delicious (sensuous, receptive) and diligent (strenuous, active)"
(95). 1n this he is closer to Wordsworth, though here Spiegelman turns his
discussion of Keats and indolence toward a rhetoric of the body in which indolence is crucial to "mental as well as poetic health" (102). Recent criticism
has attuned us to Keats's metaphorical body in its various constructions, and
we familiarly see the Keats who sought the "wakeful anguish of the soul" as
struggling against the "drowsy numbness" or "veil'd Melancholy" that lies
enshrined within "the very temple of Delight." Compare this attitude to
Shelley'S, for whom indolence "appears as a tapas within his pastoral poetry
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. where it signifies an end to struggle, labor, and history" (111). Often that
topos is imaged as a paradise, a cave or bower that is innocent and erotic at
the same time. Spiegelman traces Shelley'S pastoral imagery through a number of poems, considering the poet's recurrent invitation to escape the world
"as the outgrowth of the spoiled child's accumulative urges or, equally, as
the nobleman's sense of inherited privilege" (122). Spiegelman sees Shelley'S
"aristocratic hauteur" (109) as part of his rendering of pastoral as recovery,
though Spiegelman throws Shelley into stark contrast with the earlier chapters: "Of all the Romantic renditions of pastoral, Shelley'S is the least tainted
by a georgic impulse, in spite of his radical political leanings" (129).
"Adonais," for example, despite its "multiple homages" (132) to earlier practitioners of pastoral elegy, is less a joint laboring than an experiment in performance. Spiegelman'S reading emphaSizes a self-theatrical Shelley, for
whom pastoral is spectacle, artifice, self-conscious drama.
Spiegelman's final chapter is divided between Whitman and Frost, with
additional short readings of poems by Elizabeth Bishop and James Merrill.
Rather than pursue the topos of indolence through later nineteenth-century
English poetry (e.g., Tennyson's "Lotos-Eaters"), Spiegelman crosses over to
Whitman and Frost to find "the truest confirmation of the legacy of the
English Romantics" (142). Whitman, however, rarely expresses the guilt or
ambivalence toward indolence seen in Wordsworth, for example, nor does
he engage in a poetry of encounter: "writing was the substitute for physical
adventure, whether touristic or erotic" (149). By contrast, Frost inhabits a
pastoral-georgic world in which play and work coincide, where idleness
"comes as a reward or gift after work, but it also prepares the way, as gestation, for work to come" (157). Spiegelman makes a case for the varying influences of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats as contributing to the
development of the indolence tapos in its American variations.
As he ranges over several authors, encouraging the reader to rethink the
relation between aesthetic work and play, Spiegelman grounds his discussion in close readings of a variety of texts~often less-discussed poems, as in
the case of Wordsworth's" A Poet's Epitaph" or even "The Brothers" -and
he is sensitive to subtle stylistic matters as well as to the larger reach of his
argument. That reach includes an ongoing dispute with the reductiveness (of
new historicists who cannot deal with aesthetics in good faith. Though Spiegelman does not explicitly thematize criticism as part of the otium / negotium
continuum, it is implicit in his detailed readings that the art or sullen craft of
interpretation can likewise be figured as both work and play, a wantoning in
wild poesy that sustains us as we write, and serve, and teach.

University of Western Ontario

J. Douglas Kneale

Intimate Violence: Reading Rape and Torture in Twentieth-Century Fiction by
Laura E. Tanner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Pp. 208.
$25.00.
After I had agreed to review this book, it sat unopened on my desk for
several months while I tried to work up the courage to read it. People who
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came into my office would see it lying there, its glossy black cover broken by
a gaping, wound-like patch of red displaying the title in ragged black letters,
and invariably they would ask me, "Why are you reading that?" In all those
months, nobody ever said to me, "Hey, that sounds like a really great read"
or "I, too, am deeply interested in the subject of torture; could you lend me
the book when you're done?" Instead, one person after another reacted to
the mere presence of such a book exactly as I did: with revulsion and avoidance.

In fact, Intimate Violence: Reading Rape and Torture in Twentieth-Century
Fiction takes as its central subject precisely the kind of readerly resistance
that the book itself evokes. Without ever being so facile as to assume (as, for
instance, many commentators on W. B. Yeats's poem IfLeda and the Swan"
have done) that representations of violence can be reduced to mere metaphors for reading and writing, Laura Tanner explores the ways in which fictional accounts of rape and torture enact their own kind of "intimate
violence" upon us, their unwilling, brutalized readers. The strategies of resistance that Tanner offers us are cliverse and challenging if often extremely
subtle. Ultimately, Tanner suggests, our only weapon against violence of the
body is the power of the mind, and engagement with the scourge of physical
violence begins with the empowering act of critical reading: "Seeing into violence ... becomes a form of resistance when what is exposed before the eyes
of the reader/viewer is not his or her own helplessness but the dynamics of
violation; the critical reader in the scene of violence uncovers not just the
vulnerability of the victim or the observer but the very power dynamics
upon which the violator's force depends. The power of the reader to resist
.. . the 'force' of the text often parallels, in the representation of intimate violence, the power of the reader to resist compliCity-either through passive
viewing or unconscious participation in the act of violence represented therein" (15-16).
In the course of demonstrating such strategies of readerly resistance, Tanner takes us on an intimate tour of a wide range of twentieth century texts
that depict acts of physical violence: the rape scenes in William Faulkner's
Sanctuary and Gloria Naylor's The Women of Brewster Place; the contrasting
depictions of torture in George Orwell's 1984 and two recent Amnesty International television commercials; the interplay of symbolic and literal violence in D. M. Thomas's The White Hotel; the commodification of sexuality
and violence in Hubert Selby'S Last Exit to B1'00klyn; the psychotic brutality of
Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho; and the imbrications of race and gender
in the rape and murder scenes depicted in Louise Erdrich's Tracks. Tanner
focuses in minute detail on the most graphic and disturbing portrayals of violence in each of these works, deftly marshalling reader-response, semiotic,
and materialist theoretical models in a series of intricate readings that succeed above all due to her considerable skills at close textual analysis. "The
process of finding one's self in a scene of fictional violence," Tanner argues,
"is the first step toward choosing a location rather than being located" (16).
Tanner's own choice of critical location is a courageous one, and her readers
cannot help but benefit from the clear-sightedness and sensitivity with which
she approaches such a fraught and difficult subject.
Like any critical study, of course, Tanner's book contains its share of limi-
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tations and omissions. In a work that draws so heavily upon Marxist and
materialist social critique, for instance, one misses any sense of historical and
cultural specificity; Tanner's emphasis on readers precludes her asking pertinent questions about the aesthetic agendas, social backgrounds, historical situations, and national identities of the writers she discusses, so that not only
rape and torture themselves but also the writers' strategies of representation
come to seem like timeless acts rather than the SOcially contingent entities
that they are. Moreover, although the cover blurb promises to arm us with a
theory of reading "that emphaSizes the reader's status as negotiator between
the conventions of representation and the material dynamics of violence,"
the book's own negotiation between representation and reality takes place,
necessarily, within the realm of the purely semiotic, so that it remains unclear how any mode of readerly resistance, however compelling, could affect
or change the material world in which women and men really are raped and
tortured daily. "My study of reading," Tanner notes, "represents a move toward empowering myself and other readers with the ability to resist the pull
of violation, if only in representational terms" (ix). That "if only" is crucial;
intellectual analysis of representations of violence is not the same thinghowever much one might wish it could be-as countering violence itself.
Paradoxically, in fact, Intimate Violence, even while empowering the reader
of violent fiction, increases one's sense of impotence in the face of real-life
violence, for it points to and even deepens the very gap between substance
and symbol that it aims, in Tanner's words, to "negotiate." How, then, is the
enlightened, empowered reader supposed to respond to the violence enacted
not only in but also by this book? What strategies of readerly resistance can
and should we undertake? Reading Intimate Violence, with its focus on the
most grisly scenes in each of the fictional texts it discusses, is an even more
wrencrnng experience than reading almost any of those texts individually.
Jndeed, the cumulative effect of the book is one not of empowerment but of
despair, as violence comes to seem ever more universal, ever more omnipresent, even while remaining depressingly variable in form, degree, and representation.
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